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Abstract 
 
KIRAN BHARDWAJ: Kant’s Moral Philosophy and the Role of the Highest Good 
(Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) 
 
 
Described as the union of complete virtue and complete happiness in accordance with 
such virtue, the concept of the highest good draws together Kant’s account of moral virtue 
with special features of humans: our need for happiness and hopes for justice. However, the 
highest good fails to perform its function in Kant’s theory if either of two strong criticisms 
holds: if it is inconsistent with Kant’s account of moral motivation, or if it is unimportant in 
moral action. I argue that a historical survey of Kant’s explanation of the highest good shows 
how improved argumentation in the later works helps Kant to resolve any apparent 
inconsistency. And while the highest good is not important in everyday moral action, I 
conclude that we should use it to resolve worries about the futility of moral action. As a 
result, the highest good has an undeniably central role in Kant’s ethics.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Kant’s moral philosophy features two concepts of the good: the supreme good and the 
highest good. The first, the supreme good, is action with respect to the formal nature of the 
moral law—for humans, this would consist in our perfect moral virtue (C2 64/66 and 
110/114).1 The second, the highest good, is a rich conception of the good tailored to the 
human condition. Described as the union of complete virtue and complete happiness in 
accordance with such virtue, the highest good draws together the supreme good with special 
features of humans: our need for happiness and hopes for justice. 
But how can it be appropriate to have two definitive concepts of the good? There 
must be a priority of one over the other, the two concepts must apply in different contexts, or 
some other explanation. The highest good is in the more precarious position. While the 
supreme good fits with Kant’s description of the moral law, and thus is central to Kant’s 
account of morality, the highest good is examined less rigorously and less often in the texts. 
Further, those arguments concerning the highest good have had a checkered history, 
particularly marked by a dispute centering on claims made by Lewis White Beck in his A 
Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Overall, Beck argues that certain 
claims Kant makes about the highest good are inconsistent with other parts of Kant’s moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Moral virtue is more complicated than ‘acting upon the moral law’, however. As Kant writes in the 
Doctrine of Virtue, it also requires a consistent fortitude or strength of will to act upon the moral law 
(MM 6:380/146).  
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philosophy. We may wonder whether the highest good is worth preserving as a worthwhile 
component of Kantian ethics, or whether it should be set aside as a curiosity of Kant’s theory.  
In order to set out Kant’s preliminary explanation of the role of the highest good, I 
will consider Kant’s description of the two concepts of the good in the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. The highest good is described as having certain 
features: i) that it incorporates virtue with proportional—and thus deserved—happiness, ii) 
that is used as a ground for moral faith2, and iii) it has the role of an end of human striving. 
The second feature—the transition between Kant’s moral philosophy and his moral 
religion—could easily spin off into a discussion of unmanageable proportions. So while I 
will mention the direction of Kant’s work, I will not attempt to consider the relationship 
between the highest good and religion with any complexity. I will rather be concerned with 
Kant’s arguments about the highest good and its place in Kantian ethics. 
What does Kant positively argue for, then? The highest good is importantly related to 
the moral law, yet also sets out a vision for a possible moral world. Thus, the third mentioned 
feature—the highest good as an end of human striving—must, if Kant’s argument is not to be 
inconsistent or incomplete, rely on a distinction between Kant’s account of moral motivation 
and what Kant notes is an unrelated, but very human, concern with consequences. In order to 
make the case for this distinction, I will rely on three places in Kant’s works from the early 
1790s: a short yet dense section of the preface to the Religion, and several sections of the 
Critique of Judgment and the essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The primary object of Kant’s discussion is faith in the existence of God. A related concern is in the 
belief in the immortality of the soul (C1 A827/B855/649, among others). However, the argument for 
moral faith in the existence of God depends on the whole concept of the highest good, while the 
argument for moral faith in our immortality does not depend on the whole concept of the highest 
good. Thank you to Robert Adams for pointing this out to me. 
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but it Does not Apply in Practice’”. This distinction can help resolve any perceived tension 
between the two concepts of the good, by allowing us to understand what is involved in 
Kant’s concept of moral action in general, and Kant’s conception of moral action for us. 
I will also consider a further complaint about not the consistency, but the importance 
of the concept of the highest good: after all, everyday moral action does not need to be aimed 
at the highest good. Then why does Kant see the need for the further end at all? For Kant’s 
argument to be successful, Kant must do two things: first, establish that rational beings 
necessarily construct a ‘systematic unity’3 of all the ends we have (even if this is not 
consciously or purposefully), and second, establish that our everyday duties coordinate with 
this unified, complete end.  
I conclude that the way we should think of the highest good as part of everyday moral 
action is not that it should be taken into account in every action, but rather we should use it to 
resolve worries about the futility of moral action and any resulting moral despair. What this 
would mean is that the highest good not only serves as a transition to the moral religion, but 
also has an undeniably central role in Kant’s ethics itself. Overall, I believe that the highest 
good is a central, and compelling, feature of Kant’s moral philosophy—one deserving of 
more than a peripheral glance. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While Kant’s terminology is opaque, the language of ‘systematic unity’ comes from C1 
A808/B836/637-8. In this section, Kant seems to be concerned with the coordination issues of free 
agents. A first issue is that of one’s own ends: we know from experience that a single person’s myriad 
ends and purposes cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In that case, why think that all my ends can be 
consistent at all? Another issue is about the coordination of multiple free agents. Why think that all 
the actions taken by these individuals will not be chaotic or at cross-purposes? Kant takes the 
systematic unity to be the satisfaction of all those ends consistent with morality in a single, complete 
end—a harmonization of one’s own will with itself and with others. The discussion returns again at 
C1 A815/B843/641-2, where Kant presents the idea of God as necessary to bring about this kind of 
unity.  
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1. The Two Concepts of the Good 
 
The highest good for human beings is complete virtue (that is, acting upon the moral 
law4), and complete happiness in proportion to that virtue (C1 A813/B841/640-1; C2 110-
11/115). Given the perceived rigor of Kant’s ethics, this description counters a possible 
misconception of what the good is in his moral philosophy: the highest good for human 
beings is not moral virtue alone.5 Acting upon the moral law is fundamental to right action, 
but morality is the ‘supreme good’, rather than the highest good. The highest good, given its 
description, contains the supreme good.  
Whatever the concept of the highest good does, it does not allow us to dispose of the 
supreme good as a freestanding concept, but neither is the supreme good a sufficient concept 
of the good to serve all of Kant’s purposes. Both, in some sense, are definitive concepts of 
the good despite the fact that the highest good is defined with respect to the supreme good. 
So what is the argument for the combination of virtue (the supreme good) and happiness into 
the ‘highest good’? And why do these two concepts of the good nonetheless have 
independent force in Kant’s moral theory?  
The two earlier Critiques both give answers to the first question in the sections in 
which Kant introduces the highest good: particularly, the Canon of the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Both of these works supply 
preliminary results, but neither fully gives a fruitful argument for why the highest good is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See footnote 1.   
5 Kant was very definitive in countering this misconception: a contemporary critic had accused him of 
asserting that adherence to the moral law is the one and only ultimate end for man. Kant responded 
that the ultimate end is neither human morality nor happiness, but “the highest good possible on 
earth, the union and harmony of them both” (“On the Common Saying” 64-5).  
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necessary for morality for human beings. If this is the case, then discussions of the highest 
good that solely refer to these two works do not fully settle the concept of the highest good 
within Kant’s moral philosophy.  
 
1.1 The Two Concepts of the Good in the Critique of Pure Reason 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant begins his introduction of the highest good by 
discussing the three practical postulates: of the immortality of the soul, freedom, and the 
existence of God (C1 A798/B826/631). In the context of this work, Kant has already noted 
that these concepts are at the heart of the fundamental questions of metaphysics, yet we can’t 
know, just by reasoning, that they are true. Yet Kant already has announced the position that 
he will further develop in the Critique of Practical Reason: practical reason can 
appropriately set these three concepts as practical postulates.  
Kant indicates that when we consider ‘the supreme end’, we are concerned only with 
moral interests (C1 A801/B829/632-3). But in the Canon, Kant directs us to a further 
question: if I do what I ought to do, what may I hope? This question is intended to be both 
practical and theoretical. Reason can serve us in two ways: it can lead us to our own 
happiness (when I act on rules of prudence), and it can lead us to what we must do in order to 
be worthy of happiness (by acting upon the law of morality) (C1 A806/B834/636). Kant has 
spent much time asserting the importance of the latter for us as rational beings, and that as a 
result moral virtue is the supreme good. 
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But the importance of happiness to us cannot be permanently deferred or ignored. So 
after the question of what I ought to do is resolved, in hoping I am directed to happiness6  
(C1 A805/B834/636). But so as not to undermine the importance of the supreme good, Kant 
is interested in a possible ‘systematic unity’: a unity of the moral law and the happiness 
compatible with the moral law. As a result, Kant develops a conception of the moral world: 
the world as it ought to be, as conceived by “referring to the sensible world, viewed, 
however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment” (C1 A808/B836/637 
and A809/B834/636). The moral world refers to the world, but then idealizes it into what we 
might think of a utopian vision. That way, we get the best of what human experience has to 
offer, as Kant has framed it: the fulfillment of morality and deserved happiness for all 
rational beings. Such a vision also would prove to harmonize our experience as both free and 
as members of an empirical world.  
This moral world must be accepted as an end, Kant asserts.7 And if one accepts it as a 
necessary end, it is equally necessary that one accept the conditions of its attainment, since 
one cannot give it up as an end (C1 A823/B851/647). The practical postulates, then, are the 
conditions for such a moral world (C1 A810-11/B838-9/638-9). Kant writes that “without a 
God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are 
indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action. For they do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Kant’s definition, at this point in the text, is that happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires with 
respect to their manifoldness, degree, and duration (C1 A806/B834/636). 
7 Of course, this leaves open the way in which this must be accepted as an end: perhaps an end to be 
pursued intentionally as an aim? Or, as a single end—a ‘unity of ends’—which plays the fundamental 
role in a teleological conception of the world? In the Religion, Kant suggests more of the latter view, 
grounded on a view that we necessarily think about purposes, and so seek a unified end. Here, he 
speaks of ‘ultimate ends’ rather than ‘purposive unity’, but it seems plausible to think the same issue 
is at stake (R FN 6:7/36).  
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not fulfil in its completeness that end which is natural to every rational being and which is 
determined a priori, and rendered necessary, by that same pure reason” (C1 
A813/B841/640). 
This passage is ripe for consideration. As Beck did, it is possible to read especially 
the phrase “not springs of purposes and action” as an indication of Kant’s troubles with 
explaining moral motivation. This reading led Beck to reject the concept of the highest good 
as inconsistent as a practical part of ethics. I think it is better to see it as part of Kant’s 
consideration of the importance of the human concern with consequences in a way that does 
not commit him to its role as motivation. (I will consider this further in section 2.3).  
The vision of the highest good is intended to be a compelling one: the moral world 
leads “to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance 
with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is in accordance with universal and 
necessary laws of morality), and thus united the practical with speculative reason.” (C1 
A816/B844/642). Kant argues that we seek this purposive unity due to the nature of our 
will8—yet Kant does not discuss what about the will’s nature requires such purposive unity. I 
wish to highlight this concept of purposive unity in the first Critique, because it features 
heavily in the arguments for the highest good in later works, but there with description of 
what in the will’s nature leads to such a conception of a moral world.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “But the former purposive unity is necessary, and founded on the will’s own essential nature, and 
this latter unity [of design in nature] which contains the condition of its application in concreto must 
be so likewise” (C1 A817/B845/643). 
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1.2 The Two Concepts of the Good in the Critique of Practical Reason 
 
The Critique of Practical Reason presents the concept of the highest good as the 
“unconditioned totality of the object of the pure practical reason” (C2 108/112). As in the 
first Critique, this ‘totality’ goes beyond the formal features of the moral law, which requires 
that “only the form of maxim be universally legislative” (C2 109/113). There is a perfect 
harmony, Kant asserts, between the moral law and the highest good as the object of the 
practical reason, as long as we understand the priority of the first (C2 110/114).  
Kant argues that in this way the “concept of [the highest good] and the idea of its 
existence as possible through our practical reason are likewise the determining ground of the 
pure will” (C2 109-110/114). But this way of putting the relationship opens a question: how 
can the concept of the highest good and the idea of its existence as possible through our 
practical reason also be the determining ground of the pure will? One might think that the 
character of the highest good and the moral law, even if the one is defined with respect to the 
other, are so distinct that it would not allow for this result.  
Part of the claim, of course, relies on the fact that we are (like in the first Critique) 
speaking about the human will: our practical reason, not reason for any rational being. After 
all (as Kant continues in the next section) for finite rational beings such as ourselves, virtue is 
not “the entire and perfect good as the object of the faculty of desire”.9 In order to complete 
the good for such beings, happiness is required as well (C2 110/114). The highest good is, on 
Kant’s view, practically necessary in order to combine these two concepts of virtue and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines the will as the faculty of desire (C3  5:172/59). That is, 
“the faculty for being through one’s representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these 
representations” (C3 FN 5:177/65).  
 	  
9 
happiness. The motivation for such a combination is that he, again, has established the 
priority of the importance of virtue, yet also appreciates the importance of happiness (on the 
condition that it is deserved).  
Perhaps Kant’s clearest expression of what proposition is entailed in this 
“connection” is what he says a rational being would will: “to be in need of happiness and 
also worthy of it and yet not to partake of it could not be in accordance with the complete 
volition of an omnipotent rational being” (C2 110/114-5). In a certain group of rational 
beings—those who are rational (and therefore may be moral or not), yet are also finite (and 
so in need of happiness)—an individual who is worthy of happiness ought to be happy. This 
view contrasts with the ancient Greek schools, as characterized by Kant: each school selected 
either virtue or happiness as fundamental and then asserted that the other element was part 
and parcel of the other: thus, “To be conscious of one’s maxims as leading to happiness is 
virtue” and “To be conscious of one’s virtue is happiness” (my italics, C2 111/115). Unlike 
the Greek schools, Kant both wishes to assert that happiness and virtue are distinct, but also 
that both are elements of the highest good. 
There are two possibilities to unify two distinct concepts into another: analytic, and 
thus self-contradictory to deny because the pursuit of virtue and happiness are identical 
(which Kant has rejected). The alternative is that it is a synthetic connection “predicated 
upon virtue’s producing happiness as something different from the consciousness of virtue, 
as a cause produces an effect.” (C2 111/115). Kant’s solution to the problem of two distinct 
elements of the highest good, then, is to conceive of them as combined as cause-and-effect: 
when one is virtuous (or not), the resulting effect is that one will be happy in exact proportion 
to one’s worthiness to be happy. 
 	  
10 
But establishing any connection between virtue and happiness, even one of cause and 
effect, is troublesome. Kant notes that in the work of the Analytic, the maxims of virtue and 
those of one’s own happiness are heterogeneous, and so “strongly limit and check each 
other” (C2 112/117). This discordance between virtue and happiness is Kant’s reason, 
indeed, for asserting that their connection in the highest good must be synthetic (C2 112-
3/117). Kant flatly denies that the pursuit of virtue can be identical to that of happiness or 
vice versa. If that were the case, then when a person sought out happiness, she would be 
virtuous—but on Kant’s definition of virtue as action in accordance with the moral law, that 
is impossible. Nor does a virtuous person or a vicious person receive her just reward (in the 
world as we have experienced it thus far)—we can point to cases in which good people suffer 
greatly, or bad people live happy lives.  As a result, Kant says that because the combination 
of virtue and deserved happiness in the highest good cannot be analytic, it must be synthetic. 
Furthermore, Kant asserts that the highest good is an a priori concept (C2 113/117). So in 
these assertions, we see the bones of an a priori argument for the proposition that virtue and 
deserved happiness are combined in the highest good as Kant indicates. However, it isn’t a 
particularly satisfying argument—the reasons, especially for thinking about the a priori 
argument, are fairly scant.  
Kant does think that his solution to the antinomy of practical reason is a satisfying 
reason to assert virtue and happiness are connected as cause and effect (because the highest 
good “concerns a practical good, i.e., one that is possible through action” (C2 113/117)). The 
antinomy allows Kant to acknowledge that happiness can never bring about morality, nor 
morality guarantee happiness. But because the highest good is an “a priori necessary object 
of our will and is inseparably related to the moral law”, the highest good must be possible in 
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order for the moral law not to be false (C2 113-14/118). But what, exactly, we must 
necessarily will about the highest good is left unspecified here. And there are multiple 
possibilities: we must necessarily will that we in every action try to achieve the highest good, 
that we must bring about the highest good, &c.10 Perhaps the best fill-in is that I must will 
that the actions in this world of morality, considered as a whole, should ultimately lead to the 
highest good.  
Kant resolves the antinomy of practical reason similarly to the antinomy of pure 
reason, in which Kant had articulated a distinction between the world regarded as 
appearances and the world in itself. In this antinomy, Kant argues that we know we cannot 
have a necessary connection between a virtuous disposition and happiness in the empirical 
world. However, Kant seems to think that our conception of ourselves as noumenal gives us 
enough room to say “it is not impossible that the morality of intention should have a 
necessary relation as cause to happiness as an effect in the sensuous world” (C2 114-5/119). 
(Here, Kant also indicates how the postulate of God makes this possible). 
The resolution of the antinomy is intended to indicate how, even though virtue and 
(deserved) happiness may seem difficult or impossible to relate in the desired way (and are 
so, in the empirical world), this problem may be resolved via the distinction between the 
phenomenal and noumenal worlds, and the articulation of the practical postulates. That is, 
one proposition in the antinomy can be taken in two ways: “The effect of [complete] virtue is 
(proportionate) happiness” is false when empirical causation is at issue, but possibly could be 
true when noumenal causation is at issue (C2 114/119). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In the Religion, Kant will assert that the relevant proposition is that I make the highest possible 
good in the world my own ultimate end. I think that we should read what is involved here similarly: 
that it should not be an end I aim at in achieving every duty, but rather a coordination of all ends. This 
point will return in section 4.  
 	  
12 
Kant’s conclusion is this: “if we inquire into God’s final end in creating the world, we 
must name not the happiness of rational beings in the world but the highest good” (C2 
130/135). This mention of a ‘final end’ again appropriately shows the indication of the 
importance of a similar development of what was described as ‘purposive unity’ in the first 
Critique.11 But again, I find that the account of why we are drawn towards a unified final end, 
and the further articulation of the a priori argument that Kant sets up here, are both more 
fully formed in the later works.  
 
So I conclude this survey of the accounts of the two concepts of the good in the first 
two Critiques. Both passages establish a clear connection between the two goods. In both, the 
highest good is integrated with the demands of the supreme good (the good directly 
established by the moral law).  Yet there are certain holes in the theoretical construction of 
the highest good, which must be in good condition for Kant to assert that the highest good is 
practically necessary.12 While Kant is quick to appeal to the harmony that the highest good 
would bring about, there are insufficient details about what in the nature of the human will 
demands that we seek such harmony. And likewise, there is an a priori argument for the 
highest good that is here insufficient.  
In the next section, I will detail what significant claims Kant makes about the highest 
good—some of which have already been mentioned here. In later sections, I will show what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A place within the text of the second Critique that indicates Kant’s interest in a ‘perfect systematic 
unity’ is at C2 91/94, in the Critical Elucidation of the Analytic.  
12 As he does assert: “in spite of this apparent conflict of a practical reason with itself, the highest 
good is the necessary highest end of a morally determined will and a true object thereof; for it is 
practically possible, and the maxims of this will, which refer to it by their material, have objective 
reality.” (C2 115/119).  
 	  
13 
theoretical arguments or reasons Kant develops or suggests can be derived for why we should 
consider the highest good our end.  
 
 
2. Features of the Highest Good 
 
In this section, I wish to discuss the claims that Kant makes about the highest good, as 
evidenced by the materials of the two earlier Critiques. There are three features that are the 
most significant: first, that the proportionality of happiness to moral virtue is essential to the 
highest good, second, that our moral need to take the highest good as an end is a ground for 
moral faith, and third, that the highest good is an important end of human striving. 
The first feature is built into the content of the highest good, and is interesting in that 
it focuses on the notion of desert. The second demonstrates how the highest good provides 
the transition to rational faith. The last feature is of the most interest in this thesis, for 
although Kant has made some preliminary arguments for the highest good as an end of 
human striving, he has not given satisfactory arguments why he assumes this is the case.  
 
2.1 Proportionality to ensure happiness is deserved 
 
One of the most conspicuous features of the description of the highest good is the 
proportionality of happiness to moral virtue. Kant repeatedly articulates the moral importance 
of happiness’s direct proportion to merit—in other words, a principle of retributive justice. 
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This, of course, is a deeply controversial principle.13 “[The moral law] takes no account of 
desires, and the natural means to satisfying them, and considers only the freedom of a 
rational being in general, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can 
harmonise with a distribution of happiness that is made in accordance with principles.” (C1 
A806/B834/636). It is interesting that Kant claims that not only is the moral law a principle 
of freedom, but also that deserved, permissible happiness is assessed with respect to 
freedom—what is compatible with the ‘freedom of a rational being in general’.14 
For happiness to fall under the auspices of the moral law, human moral action would 
have to bring about appropriate results in the empirical world that are compatible with, and 
guided by, the prescription of the moral law. As a result, the everyday empirical needs that 
are important for us to have fulfilled, meaningful lives must all be coordinated. (This is the 
case even if we, in acting on duty, are not supposed to be influenced by these needs, nor can 
say that such coordination will be a result of our moral action). But how are we to do this? 
Kant answers: “Morality, by itself, constitutes a system. Happiness, however, does not do so, 
save in so far as it is distributed in exact proportion to morality” (C1 A811/A839/639). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 One way to lessen the bite of the controversy is to say that even though we consider desert to be 
important, we need not try to judge and bring about this ourselves. As Stephen Engstrom points out, 
Kant is committed to the idea that if there is a necessary connection between virtue and happiness, 
there also must be a necessary connection between vice and lack of happiness (764). The argument 
for intermediate cases, then, comes from the feature that virtue and happiness can be a matter of 
degree. However, it is a separate question about whether we should ourselves try to proportion 
happiness to virtue. Engstrom points out that if we try to limit or diminish the happiness of the 
vicious, this is contrary to the virtue of beneficence (768). I would also note that it sets up the 
questions of “Who am I to judge?”—we have limited knowledge about other people’s motives, 
purposes, and even their actions, which sets up limits to how correctly or sensitively we could bring 
about appropriate happiness (or lack thereof) to others and ourselves. In his paper, Engstrom makes 
an excellent argument that denies that we have a duty to proportion happiness to virtue, even if we 
have a duty to bring about the highest good (772).  
14 Note that in the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that it is a duty to take 
the happiness of others of one of our main ends. (MM 6:387-8/151-2).  
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other words, deserved happiness—proportioned to one’s moral virtue—can solve what Kant 
sees as a problem: how happiness (necessary for us as empirical beings) can be appropriate, 
given how he conceives of us as moral beings. Of course, asserting the importance of the 
proportionment of happiness to virtue is not sufficient to bring about results, especially given 
our limitations of knowledge, time, and ability—one reason that Kant sees that moral faith is 
necessary for us to be satisfied about the relationship of the two elements of the highest good.  
 
2.2 As the ground for moral faith 
 
In the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant wrote that the “achievement 
of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral 
law” (C2 122/126). (I will discuss this further in 2.3.) But rational beings such as ourselves 
are unable to accomplish either part of the highest good: we cannot make sufficient progress 
towards perfect moral virtue, and we cannot correctly proportion happiness to morality (C2 
122/126-7, 124/128-9). As a result, we must postulate that two things are the case: that our 
souls are immortal, giving us the chance to endlessly progress towards moral perfection, and 
that God exists and will proportion happiness to moral perfection (C2 123/127, 124/129).  
So the two practical postulates (not including the postulate of freedom, which plays a 
very different role in Kant’s ethics) are important—Kant probably would say inseparable—
corollaries to the proposition that the highest good is the necessary highest end of a morally 
determined will (as stated at C2 115/119). Kant’s conception of rational faith is developed 
because of the importance of the highest good. 
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Of course, Kant wants to maintain that morality has authority independently of 
religion. That is, one must acknowledge the validity of the moral law whether or not one 
believes in the existence of God (C3 5:450-1/316)15. However, Kant was not particularly 
worried that atheism would be a likely temptation—partly because he believed that the 
highest good, and the postulates that stem from it, are “irresistibly imposed” on us by 
practical reason (C3 5:451/316)16. But the practical postulates prevent one from thinking that 
moral action is hopeless—as moral belief, they guarantee that the ultimate result that we 
hope and strive for is attainable (C3 5:450-1/316, 5:452/318).17  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The text reads: “This proof [Note: Kant has just come to the end of a proof, the conclusion of which 
is “that we must assume a moral cause of the world (an author of the world) in order to set before 
ourselves a final end” (C3 5:450/316)]… is not meant to say that it is just as necessary to assume the 
existence of God as it is to acknowledge the validity of the moral law, hence that whoever cannot 
convince himself of the former can judge himself to be free from the obligations of the latter. No! All 
that would have to be surrendered in that case would be the aim of realizing the final end in the world 
(a happiness of rational beings harmoniously coinciding with conformity to the moral law, as the 
highest and best thing in the world) by conformity to the moral law.” (C3 5:450-1/316). In other 
words, if one is (irrationally) an atheist, one must still be moral—but one must give up the belief that 
the highest good is possible. 
16 The text reads: “But the one requirement of the final end, as practical reason prescribes it to beings 
in the world, is an end irresistibly imposed upon them by their nature (as finite beings), which reason 
would subject to the moral law as an inviolable condition, and would also have universally known in 
accordance with that law, and thereby makes the promotion of happiness, in consensus with morality, 
into the final end.” (C3 5:451/316-7). Lara Denis reads Kant, both in the Critique of Judgment and the 
Critique of Practical Reason, as thinking our belief in God is rationally necessary, but we have no 
duty to believe in God—strictly speaking, only to promote the highest good (Denis 201). If Denis is 
correct, then this helps make sense of this passage: Kant acknowledges the possibility of a person 
(irrationally) failing to believe in God. However, Kant’s conception of practical reason is such that if 
we are to be rational, we must believe in God.  
17 Other commentators have worked to separate out the notions of the highest good and moral faith. 
Andrews Reath, for example, argues that there may be a secular ‘hope’ that we can legitimately act 
for—making moral action not absurd—yet which doesn’t require the full-blown theological hopes of 
the practical postulates (Reath 600-1). In other words, Reath rejects the need for moral faith in favor 
of a secular social ideal (Reath 617). 
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2.3 As an end of human striving 
 
The main focus of this paper is one further claim Kant makes about the highest good, 
namely that it is an end we ought to hold (in some way). In the Critique of Practical Reason, 
Kant concluded: “Since, now, the furthering of the highest good, which contains this 
connection in its concept, is an a priori necessary object of our will and is inseparably related 
to the moral law, the impossibility of the highest good must prove the falsity of the moral law 
also” (114/118). In that statement, Kant indicated both how the moral law and “the furthering 
highest good” are rationally inseparable, but the description also suggests that it is important 
that we strive to bring it about—even if actually achieving the highest good is impossible for 
us. Likewise, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had indicated that the concept of the 
moral world is a practical idea—it ought to have an influence in the empirical world “to bring 
that world, so far as may be possible, in conformity with the idea.” (C1 A808/B836/637).  
But there are various ways to conceive of the highest good as an end of human 
striving, some better and some worse. And the way that this end is conceived can radically 
change one’s interpretation of the highest good.  
 
One first issue to resolve is how the highest good ought to play a role with respect to 
moral action. Occasionally, Kant is unclear about what he sees as the proper role for the 
highest good—as a supplementary source of motivation, or as distinctively rounding out 
moral action in a different way? Recall the passage, already mentioned, which indicates that 
we need the highest good as a source of purpose and action:  
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(A) “It is necessary that the whole course of our life be subject to moral maxims, but it is 
impossible that this should happen unless reason connects with the moral law, which is a 
mere idea, an operative cause which determines for such conduct as is in accordance with the 
moral law an outcome, either in this or in another life, that is in accordance with our supreme 
ends. Thus without a God and without a world invisible to us but hoped for, the glorious ideas 
of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and 
action. For they do not fulfil in its completeness that end which is natural to every rational 
being and which is determined a priori, and rendered necessary, by that same pure reason.” 
(C1 A812-3/B840-1/640).  
 
 
The phrase, “springs of purpose and action”, prepares us to expect that on Kant’s view, 
without the highest good (as assured by the practical postulates), morality will be lacking in 
purpose and action. Kant has a major problem, if so—Kant has staked very heavily on the 
moral law being sufficient for moral motivation. So how do we make sense of this claim 
about purpose and action, without it affecting the claim about the motivation of the moral 
law? 
A similar passage worth consideration is at the end of the first chapter of the Dialectic 
of the second Critique. Here, Kant writes that the moral law is the sole determining ground 
for the pure will (C2 109/113). And yet, even after making this strong initial claim about the 
role of the moral law, he writes that:  
 
(B) “it is self-evident not merely that, if the moral law is included as the supreme condition in 
the concept of the highest good, the highest good is then the object, but also that the concept 
of it and the idea of its existence as possible through our practical reason are likewise the 
determining ground of the pure will. This is because the moral law, included and thought in 
this concept, and no other object, determines the will as required by the principle of 
autonomy.” (C2 109-110/114).  
 
This passage led Lewis White Beck to clarify that what Kant meant here was not that the 
highest good was an alternative source of moral motivation. (Beck worded this even more 
harshly: he accused this passage as being an “inept” way of making a point (Beck 243).) But 
Beck jumps straight from the language of ‘determining grounds’ to that of motivation. It 
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seems to him inconsistent with the rest of Kant’s theory that the highest good plays any role 
in motivation (Beck 244).  
And Beck is correct in saying that Kant cannot consistently hold that the highest good 
is a motive for the pure will. The worry is that if the highest good serves as an incentive to 
make certain decisions and bring about certain actions (I will perform such and such action 
because I want to bring about the highest good), it, if it functions like any other empirical 
incentive, would undermine how we can conceive of ourselves as free moral agents. Beck’s 
error is that in reading these passages as making a point about motivation, he misses any 
alternative explanation about the highest good. As a result, Beck rejects the claim that the 
highest good can also be a determining ground of the will.  
However, Beck moves too quickly. Kant does make two claims: 1) the moral law is 
the sole ground for determining the pure will, and 2) the idea that the highest good is possible 
through practical reason is also the determining ground of the pure will. This seems 
contradictory. However, we can perhaps clarify that there are two possibilities: speaking of 
the rational will in general, and speaking of the rational will of human beings or other finite 
rational beings. We postulate that we, as free beings, can determine what to do solely based 
upon the moral law. But our experience as rational beings who are, in some sense, also 
subject to the empirical world is such that that we cannot and should not leave out our 
empirical needs when giving a full account of morality.  
Instead, Kant may be pointing to a feature of human experience that does not commit 
him to a view that the highest good serves as moral motivation. Rather, Kant conceives of the 
highest good as unifying moral purpose and action in the world into a single ideal object 
which meets a natural need. That unification is not necessary as part of motivating us to 
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action, but it is a way of making our empirical features compatible18—and harmonized in the 
way promised in the first two Critiques—with the moral motivation indicated by the 
postulate of freedom.  
In the next section, I wish to consider the arguments of the later works: the Religion, 
the Critique of Judgment, and the essay, “On the Common Saying”. They more clearly 
articulate the missing pieces in the earlier Critiques—particularly in filling out a conception 
of the human will, and offering clearer a priori arguments for the highest good. But there is a 
distinction made in these later works that can more clearly illuminate the two earlier 
Critiques, and which explains Kant’s language of ‘purpose’ without committing him to 
untenable views about motivation.  
Let me begin by setting out this distinction on its own, and then illustrating how this 
may work in reference to the two problematic passages above, (A) C1 A812-3/B840-1/640 
and (B) C2 109-110/114. Moral motivation, Kant argues, can look very similar to sensuous 
motivation. However, in postulating the existence of free will, we must also postulate the 
existence of moral motivation that is not sensuous determination. There is both a sensuous 
determination of the faculty of desire, as well as a pure practical determination—the first 
characterizes action with regards to empirical incentives, and the second characterizes moral 
action (C2 116-7/121).   
Kant may have meant that the idea of the highest good as possible, if it likewise 
determines the pure will, does more than just characterize a formal feature of morality for 
noumenal, free agents. Because part of the content of the highest good involves deserved 
happiness, it necessarily takes into account the cause-and-effect nature of the description of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We have various needs, many of which conflict with each other and with the needs of others. Also 
see footnote 3. 
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phenomenal, and empirically determined agents. If so, the highest good serves as a way of 
thinking how to unify these two features: noumenal freedom and empirical causation.19 
But we must be careful in saying that the highest good plays a motivational role in 
moral action. It depends upon what we mean by motivation. If the proposition that the 
highest good must be the consequence of my action is all that is involved in moral action, 
then Kant would be in trouble as Beck thought: in that case, the highest good compromises 
Kant’s account of autonomy. But the other possibility is that we are, first and foremost, moral 
beings and can think of ourselves as making free choices. This has to do with the account that 
Kant develops about the moral law. But we are also empirical beings. As such, we are 
secondarily, but still necessarily concerned with the consequences of our moral action in the 
empirical world (which is distinct from what motivation may have inspired it). The highest 
good then aids us to conceive of the results of our moral action (which, in line with the 
postulate of freedom, was morally motivated).  
If we read Kant as offering this view of the highest good, then we can make better 
sense of passages from Kant’s earlier works, which read as if Kant is making claims about 
motivation that are inconsistent with his overall moral philosophy. Kant’s description of the 
highest good as not only objects of approval, but also “springs of purpose and action”, could 
then be read as indicating that we care about, perhaps even as a rational requirement, such a 
complete end. Further, even Kant can consistently make the claim that the highest good can 
serve as the determining ground of the pure will (which is itself worth doubt) is an indication 
of how the pure will works for the human condition, there is a remaining story to fill in about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Naturally, this fits well with Kant’s project of the Antinomy of Practical Reason.  
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the will. Kant’s view of the highest good is clearer in the later works of the early 1790s. So I 
will continue by working through those arguments in order to illustrate this distinction.  
Beck made an argument that says that Kant cannot have it both ways: the highest 
good cannot both serve as a motive, while the moral law is the sole motive for moral action. 
But we may accept, with Beck, that the highest good cannot serve as a motive—and instead, 
think of it as a required, unified conception of what the empirical world would be like if the 
rational beings in it were to always act morally, without this conception being the motivation 
for moral action. In this way, Kant can have both claims, without disturbing his argument 
about moral motivation.  
 
 
 
3. The Later Arguments 
 
Thus far, I have reviewed the arguments for the connection between the two concepts 
of the good, indicated major claims Kant makes about the highest good, and set out the 
distinction that I think is essential to understanding the role of the highest good in Kant’s 
moral philosophy—namely, that the highest good responds to our sensitivity to the results of 
moral action in the empirical world, in a way importantly distinct from moral motivation.  
However, while this distinction may make better sense of the arguments of the first 
two Critiques, another question is what textual basis there is for this distinction. In the earlier 
Critiques, the highest good is presented as important because it provides a harmony of 
reason. The argument relies upon an assertion that the highest good is the object and final 
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end of practical reason. But these early works are not as precise in their language and clear in 
their argumentation. Attention to later works can give us a richer account of why we may 
take the highest good as a serious and essential component of Kant’s moral philosophy.  
The passages in the Religion, Critique of Judgment, and the essay “On the Common 
Saying” use a more explicit account of purposiveness to explain the relationship between the 
moral law and the highest good. Through this section, I will try to argue how these later 
arguments more clearly articulate why Kant is not committed to the highest good to be 
motivation, but instead another role based on ends.  
 
3.1 The relationship between the moral law and the highest good 
 
One of the most important indications of how Kant wishes to argue for the highest 
good as our end comes in a section and extensive footnote in the preface of Religion within 
the Boundaries of Pure Reason. Kant writes: “But although on its own behalf morality does 
not need the representation of an end which would have to precede the determination of the 
will, it may well be that it has a necessary reference to such an end, not as the ground of its 
maxims but as a necessary consequence accepted in conformity to them.” (R 6:4/34). This 
description clearly establishes that moral motivation must not be brought about by maxims 
determined by an empirical end (not even one such as the highest good, if it is such an 
empirical incentive). And yet, morality can also allow for the consideration of an end as a 
necessary consequence of our free moral action, provided that it meets certain criteria: it 
must an end that conforms with all our moral actions. The highest good is such an end, and is 
special as a “point of reference for the unification of all ends” (R 6:5/35). Why and how it 
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would be necessary consequence remains to be explained, as does how, precisely, we are to 
‘accept’ it.  
But here is our first step: Kant has indicated that there is a split in how we need to 
conceive of the moral determination of the will. The order of priority must be kept straight: 
moral action must be grounded solely on the motivation of the moral law, as conceived of in 
the postulate of freedom. And yet, the determination of the will must involve (Kant argues) 
some reference to an end as a consequence—presumably, that after we have freely 
determined what is right or wrong to do, we consider the results of doing so. The reason that 
this ‘end as a consequence’ is important is because for us, determinations of the will occur 
without an effect in the empirical world (R 6:4/34). That is, we consider ourselves to be 
moral beings. But we also are empirical beings, subject to (as Kant conceives it) 
deterministic laws of cause and effect. So even if we postulate that we are free to act morally, 
we are still concerned with the consequences of our moral actions as they play out in the 
empirical world.  
Of course we get a more careful presentation than in the Critique of Practical Reason 
of how the highest good could determine the will. In the second Critique, Kant had stated that 
both the moral law and the concept of the possibility of the highest good could be 
determining grounds of the pure will. But in the Religion, we get a more sensitive relation of 
the highest good to the work of the will. Here, even if we must consider our will determined 
with reference to the moral law (freely), we cannot leave our consideration of moral action at 
that, and so also must consider results in the empirical world (cause-and-effect) (see R 
6:5/34).  
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The concept of the highest good helps to make sense of both free moral action and 
cause-effect causality.20 However, Kant continues by writing that even if we determine how 
to act with reference only to the moral law, such a determination only instructs us how to 
act—not whither (R 6:4/34). By Kant’s description of moral motivation, the formal condition 
of the moral law must be sufficient to bring about action. However, it does not give us 
guidance on the likely future of our moral action. “Whither” is a question for those beings 
that are moral, but also think in terms of effects of actions.  
We do clearly have our desired distinction, however: moral motivation must not be 
with reference to a morally worthy end, but exclusively with respect to the formal feature of 
the moral law.21 However, Kant writes that human reason is also concerned with the 
question: “What then is the result of this right conduct of ours?” (R 6:5/34). This question, 
presumably, is why Kant suggests the previous arguments: we think about what will happen 
as a result of moral action because despite the fact that we are moral beings, we are 
consequence-oriented as empirical beings. Thus, even if we have already settled on the 
appropriate thing to do (and presumably have sufficient motivation to do it) we still are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kant himself doesn’t unequivocally say this, but the disparate nature of noumenal freedom and 
empirical causation seems to be guiding his comments here (the parallel of the Antinomies of Pure 
and Practical Reason strongly indicates this reading is correct). He does say: “only in this way [in the 
concept of the ultimate end of all things] can an objective practical reality be given to the 
combination, which we simply cannot do without, of the purposiveness [deriving] from freedom and 
the purposiveness of nature.” (C3 6:5/35)—in other words, he attends to both the noumenal realm and 
that in the phenomenal realm, and indicates that we cannot do without the combination. In the 
footnote to this section, Kant also distinguishes between what rule of pure reason in the moral law, 
and the ‘limitation’ of human beings in that we are always concerned with results—which I read to be 
referring to our empirical limitations (C3 FN 6:7/36).  
21 Or as in “On the Common Saying”: “The incentive which men can have before they are given a 
specific goal (or end) can obviously be none other than the law itself, through the esteem which it 
inspires (irrespective of what ends one may have and seek to attain through obedience to the law). For 
the law, as the formal aspect of will, is all that remains if we discount the will’s particular content” 
(FN 67).  
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concerned with the consequences of the appropriate thing to do. If I am good, I still hope that 
the results of my action will also be good.  
Kant has thus argued that we have an ideal consequence or effect of our moral action 
that we can refer to: the highest good. This is an object that harmonizes the formal condition 
that we ought to act upon (duty) with the particular ends we have that also conform to duty 
(proportioned happiness) (R 6:5/34). In other words, this ideal object is an end which meets a 
natural need. And Kant must continue to insist that the belief that the complete virtue of all 
will bring about the highest good is not a ground of morality, but is derived from morality (R 
6:5/34).  
To recap, this concept of the highest good was presented as a way to unify Kant’s 
formal statement of the moral law with thinking about duty in a system of morally required 
and morally permissible ends. But Kant also suggests that the highest good is the only way 
that “an objective practical reality be given to the combination, which we simply cannot do 
without, of the purposiveness [deriving] from freedom and the purposiveness of nature” (R 
6:5/35). So Kant requires a further explanation for why the peculiarities of the highest good 
work in such a way so that it is the only way possible, and why we cannot do without 
“purposiveness”. To do so, we should move to a work written a few years prior, the Critique 
of Judgment.  
 
The Critique of Judgment focuses on the faculty of judgment. This faculty is 
described as what combines the two parts of philosophy (theoretical and practical) into one 
whole, by mediating between two faculties, reason and understanding (C3 5:176-7/64). The 
feature of judgment that is supposed to do this work is purposiveness, which explains how 
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the representation of the object can lead to the object itself (C3 5:220/105). Kant believes that 
we use purposiveness as an explanatory measure, whether there is a purposeful agent or not: 
“An object or a state of mind or even an action, however, even if its possibility does not 
necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely because its 
possibility can only be explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a 
causality in accordance with ends” (C3 5:220/105). But this is a feature of how humans (and 
presumably, beings like us) must think about action in accordance with ends.  
There is an important difference between the kind of purposiveness that may be 
useful in conceiving of morality (“practical purposiveness”) and the consideration of 
purposiveness of nature under empirical laws (“purposiveness of nature”) (C3 5:180/68, even 
more clearly in the First Introduction 20:243/43). Practical purposiveness has to do with 
human art and morals (C3 5:180). It is conceived of as the determination of a free will—but 
practical because the concept of a faculty of desire as a will must be given empirically. 
Nonetheless, the principle of practical purposiveness is a priori (C3 5:182/69).  
This feature of practical purposiveness, if Kant is right about its necessity for the 
human will, must be the reason why Kant asserts that the highest good is a necessary ultimate 
end for us. In that case, that the highest good is considered to be the unification of all our 
ends allows it to serve as the single, complete, unified purpose that Kant thinks is a 
requirement of practical reason. We are constituted in such a way, he argues, that we both 
focus our ends in such a way and must believe that this end is possible. Thus, the ‘highest 
good as a necessary end’ mediates between the moral law and the empirical world, but not as 
motivation.  
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Because the faculty of judgment is supposed to mediate between what the 
understanding does and reason does, we can patch together a conception of deterministic 
causality in accordance with the causality of freedom.  
 
“The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end, which (or its 
appearance in the sensible world) should exist, for which the condition of its possibility in 
nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible being, that is, as a human being) is 
presupposed. That which presupposes this a priori and without regard to the practical, 
namely, the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the concepts of 
nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition from the purely 
theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final 
end in accordance with the latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature; for thereby is 
the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in accord with its 
laws, cognized.” (C3 5:196/81-2).  
 
The notion of purposiveness can help us understand how Kant sees why we must conceive 
the world as agents who consider themselves free moral agents (noumenal), but also subject 
to a deterministic world (phenomenal). The power of judgment mediates between the 
‘concepts of nature’ and ‘the concept of freedom’—which I read to be indicative of how the 
human beings both are sensible beings, and free beings. Because Kant considers this 
mediation between understanding and reason to be required, and because on his view this 
mediation is only possible through the concept of a possible final end22 (at least conceptually, 
an effect of moral freedom in the empirical world), the highest good, as that final end, must 
thus serve a significant role within the scope of his ethics. Kant’s argument is set up so that, 
without the highest good, he has an incomplete account of morality. For this reason, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In the later part of the Critique of Judgment, Kant wishes to discuss the ultimate end of nature in a 
teleological system. In section 83, Kant describes a two-part end of nature: the happiness and the 
culture of the human being, culture being the kind of aptitude involved in setting ends according to 
form (C3 5:430/297, 5:431/299)—an aptitude that characterizes morality. But this sounds familiar—it 
is a description of the highest good in slightly different terminology.  	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important to consider the highest good to be a central issue in Kant’s ethics, and not merely 
an adjunct to the ethics.   
So we have a concept of the highest good that is the ultimate or final end of nature. 
Kant continues (in section 84) by describing the character of our faculty of freedom as 
unconditioned and independent, but also as aimed at ends, and so it can set for itself the 
object of the highest good in the world (C3 5:435). As a result, we can consider a moral 
teleology: we can compare the empirical world to a conceived moral world and the 
possibility of its accomplishment. In Kant’s words:  
 
“The moral law, as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom, obligates us by 
itself alone, without depending on any sort of end as a material condition; yet it also 
determines for us, and indeed does so a priori, a final end, to strive after which it makes 
obligatory for us, and this is the highest good in the world possible through freedom. 
The subjective condition under which the human being (and, according to our 
concepts, every rational finite being as well) can set a final end for itself under the above law 
is happiness. Hence the highest physical good that is possible in the world and which can be 
promoted, as far as it is up to us, as a final end, is happiness—under the objective condition 
of the concordance of humans with the law of morality, as the worthiness to be happy.” (C3 
5:450/315).” 
 
I would also like to mention one last, clear statement of how Kant conceives of the 
highest good as an end for us in “On the Common Saying: ‘That May Be True in Theory, but 
it Does Not Apply in Practice’”. This essay was written in the same period as the Religion 
and the Critique of Judgment. There are two points I would like to draw out before returning 
to the Religion. First, here Kant explicitly states that moral faith (belief in the practical 
postulates, which are for the sake of striving towards the highest good) is not a motive for the 
general concept of duty (65)—another confirmation that Beck was misled in his concerns 
about the highest good. This should again accentuate that Kant did not see a role for the 
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highest good as motive, but rather that the concept of duty gives us occasion to strive towards 
the highest good.  
Second, Kant again expressly states that the highest good (as the ultimate moral end) 
is necessary for human beings. The details are slightly different then elsewhere, but here he 
states: “the necessity of an ultimate end posited by pure reason and comprehending the 
totality of all ends within a single principle (i.e., a world in which the highest possible good 
can be realized with our collaboration) is a necessity experienced by the unselfish will as it 
rises beyond mere obedience to formal laws and creates as its own object the highest good.” 
(FN 65). So it seems that in these works from the early 1790s, Kant is very clear on two 
points: the highest good as our end is necessary given the kind of beings we are, but does not 
play the role of a motivation for duties.  
 
 
3.2 The a priori arguments 
In the earlier Critiques, I had mentioned that one insufficient attribute of the 
discussion of the highest good in the earlier Critiques was the lack of an a priori argument. 
Yet in the Preface to the Religion, we finally get an indication of how he would like to 
develop such an argument. Here, we get a two-step argument for two propositions. The first 
is that it is a synthetic a priori proposition to say that one should make the highest good in 
the world one’s own end. The second is that it is also a synthetic a priori proposition that we 
have sufficient practical reason to believe in God, and therefore a highest good in the world. 
This second proposition, going back to our features of the highest good, is illustrative of how 
Kant saw the highest good as the ground for faith.  
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3.2.1 The argument that the highest good ought to be one’s end.  
Kant defines an ultimate end as “[t]he end that contains the inescapable, and at the same time 
sufficient, condition of all other ends” (R 6:6/35). Then, Kant makes an assertion: that one’s 
own happiness is the subjective ultimate end of rational beings belonging to this world (R 
6:6/35). In other words, Kant sees us as empirically striving for—not only wanting, but 
trying to bring about—our own complete happiness without exception.  
But he stresses that we need a further argument for the proposition that every human 
ought to make the highest possible good in the world his own objective ultimate end. Kant 
writes that this further argument is necessary since the proposition “exceeds the concept of 
the duties in this world, and adds a consequence (an effect) of these duties that is not 
contained in the moral laws and cannot, therefore, be evolved out of them analytically.” (R 
6:7/35). Duties require no end that would motivate action (R 6:7/36). If they did, it would 
lead us into the argument that Beck worried about—that this commits us to the idea that in 
order to act on duty, we must have some incentive.  
In that case, why does Kant think that we should go beyond duty to conceive of an 
ultimate end that goes so far beyond the particulars of a single duty, or the formal conditions 
of duty? The reason is: “it is one of the inescapable limitations of human beings and their 
practical faculty of reason (perhaps of that faculty in all other worldly beings as well) to be 
concerned in every action with its result, seeking something in it that might serve them as an 
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end” (R 6:7/36). The moral law requires certain duties. And yet, human moral action must be 
not only postulated as motivated by the moral law, but also framed with reference to an end.23  
 
3.2.2 The argument for the necessary lawgiver  
Immediately after concluding the previous argument, Kant continues to the further 
conclusion: “if the strictest observance of the moral laws is to be thought of as the cause of 
the ushering in of the highest good (as end), then, since human capacity does not suffice to 
effect happiness in the world proportionate to the worthiness to be happy, an omnipotent 
moral being must be assumed as ruler of the world, under whose care this would come about, 
i.e., morality leads inevitably to religion.” (R 6:8/37).  
So this argument for the existence of God is a further conclusion built upon the last—
we must be able to bring about the highest end (as it is necessary). So we postulate the 
existence of a being that can do so. And this practical postulate is based upon human 
faculties and human experience. But what is important in the argument for this postulate of 
God is not the content—that it is an omnipotent being of a certain sort—but its function: that 
something in the world serves the purpose of necessarily bringing about the highest good. 
 
I have argued that the later developments of the Religion and Critique of Judgment provide a 
fuller explanation of why Kant found the role of the highest good to be so important to his 
moral philosophy, despite the fact that it is separable from the moral law. That reason is 
hinted at in the earlier Critiques: it is due to the structure of the human will, and how as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “The proposition itself is possible… only because it contains the a priori principle of the cognition 
of the determining grounds of a power of free choice in experience in general, so far as experience, by 
exhibiting the effects of morality in its ends, gives an objective, although only practical, reality to the 
concept of morality as having causality in the world.” (R 6:7-8/37). 
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empirical beings we are necessarily concerned with consequences, or ends in a system of 
cause and effect. This is the reason that the concept of practical purposiveness—a central 
feature of the Critique of Judgment—is so important for realizing why the highest good is 
essential to morality for humans. The a priori argument for the highest good would then need 
to be developed from this basis: the role of ultimate ends for the human will.  
If Kant’s arguments are satisfactory, this patches the initial holes in the arguments for 
the highest good in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. Here, 
we finally see an articulation about what is special about the human will (namely, our 
attention to ends in the empirical world) that requires that we must necessarily think the 
highest good possible. We get an explanation of how the highest good is the object of 
practical reason. We get a proper a priori argument for the highest good. And we see the 
fulfillment of Kant’s speculations about the importance of ‘purposive unity’.  
It also serves to meet some of the initial concerns about why there are two concepts of 
the good in Kant’s moral philosophy. The supreme good is fundamental for moral 
philosophy, but for human moral philosophy, Kant thinks it fundamental to frame another 
kind of good—the good of a unified end that serves to conjoin moral action, and action in the 
empirical world.  
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4. The Highest Good and Moral Action 
 
Nonetheless, even if Kant can dodge the worry that the highest good is inconsistent 
with the remainder of his moral philosophy, he may not be able to dodge the worry that the 
highest good is unimportant. The duties that Kant writes about—that I must bring about my 
moral virtue, and the happiness of others (as in the Metaphysics of Morals)—are certainly not 
motivated with reference to the complete highest good. These concrete, detailed duties don’t 
seem to further the highest good in a complete way—as Kant acknowledges in “On the 
Common Saying”, the attainment of virtue may be within our power, but not both morality 
and deserved happiness taken together (65). And Kant is rightly dubious of our ability to 
bring about our own moral perfection in any finite period of time, much less appropriately 
proportion happiness to virtue.24 So why go beyond these duties, to conceive of an end of 
human striving?  
Kant needs to have done two things successfully in order to fully respond to this 
question. First of all, Kant has to give a successful argument that we necessarily need a unity 
of ends. We can clearly see that Kant was sure of this, but his arguments for a necessary 
unity of ends in an ultimate end would need to be convincing in a more rigorous assessment 
than I have done here. 
Second, the duties that we do have—the everyday, on-the-ground duties—must 
coordinate with the concept of a unified end, in a way that if everyone were to fulfill their 
moral obligations, the world would become more like the one envisioned as the “moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See, for example, R 6:66-7/84-5. 
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world”.25 Stephen Engstrom’s explanation is one of the most cogent, arguing that we don’t 
have a separable duty to promote the highest good, but rather as we act on our perfect and 
imperfect duties, we are acting partially to promote the highest good. The duty that we have 
to “further the highest good” comes from the attempt to conceive of the totality of pure 
practical reason’s object as if in the standpoint of a being who creates and orders the world—
a coordination of all ends. Here, questions of feasibility are left aside (Engstrom 770). Thus 
we may conclude that beneficence is suitable for finite beings, but the highest good can be an 
object only for an infinite being (Engstrom 770). In other words, our everyday moral 
judgments are conceived of bringing about the highest good—but only in a certain structure, 
in which we consider the highest good as a unified ultimate end.  
In the Groundwork, Kant describes the formula of the kingdom of ends as drawing 
together, into a systematic unity, the formal and material conditions of morality (Gr 
4:436/237). Yet the vision of the kingdom of ends is likely related to this same unified vision 
of what the empirical world could be like, if only it was brought into line with morality—the 
moral world of the highest good.26 In this way, the highest good could also be conceived of as 
a heuristic. If we attempt to work through the moral problems we find difficult by thinking of 
them in reference to the kingdom of ends, this is (by another route) conceiving of them with 
reference to the practical purposiveness that Kant thinks is essential to how we experience 
and are conscious of this world.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A unified account of duty would also have to contend with worries about moral dilemmas: whether 
the highest good is impossible, because various duties conflict. Specifying that one must bring about 
only the permissible happiness of others is a good first step, but there is a serious issue lingering.  
26 Compare R 6:98-9/109. 
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But even if one rejects the notion of the highest good playing a role in our duties and 
attaining the highest good is clearly out of our grasp, how does Kant conceive of the highest 
good as important in everyday moral action? Kant was concerned, not with motivation, but 
with hope. Even if we are convinced that we ought to perform our duties, we may still worry 
about the futility of that action. All my good actions in the world may not bring about the 
desired good effects, or have hard consequences.  
So the vision of an ultimate end is a consideration of a cure for moral despair. Of 
course, Kant has also built certainty in, with the postulates of God and the immortality of the 
soul. We might again recall the passage (A) from the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant 
writes that “without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the 
glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of 
purpose and action” (C1 A813/B841/640). This view of the highest good makes sense of how 
the highest good, certified by the practical postulates, can allow us to not think of morality as 
a Sisyphean struggle. As a result, we can see how the highest good serves not only a function 
in the transition to the moral religion, but also a central role in the ethics itself. Kant thought 
of the highest good as a moral vision of purposiveness in the world.  
 
 
5. Remaining Issues 
 
I would like to conclude by considering two ways of developing how the argument 
for the highest good could be developed in ways with interesting results for normative ethics.  
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First, consider the argument for the practical postulates. In the Religion, Kant has 
filled out a Christian vision of moral religion. But the content—that of a deity, and the 
immortality of the soul—is not the motivation behind the religion. Rather, what does the 
work is their function: that one postulate makes it possible that we may achieve moral virtue, 
and the other makes it necessary that one receives deserved happiness. But this may mean 
that Kant would be committed to religious pluralism, provided that the various ways of 
cashing out the postulates fulfill their functional roles. This would be a result of conceiving 
of the highest good as a necessary function of the human will: any type of moral belief that 
the highest good is possible, other things being equal, is just as good as any other.27 
Further, consider how Kant can fold consequences into his moral theory. This is not 
to say that what concerns him is how we can achieve the best consequences in assessing the 
question “What should I do?” This is, obviously, the contrary of what Kant would say—
consequences are irrelevant to the morality of a given action in an important way. That is to 
say, on Kant’s view, certain actions (suicide, adultery, and the like) are wrong no matter what 
the positive consequences might be. But even while the consequences of other actions may 
play a role in a maxim (the purpose I intend to bring about in my action, for example), the 
ultimate criterion of rightness or wrongness of the action doesn’t turn on the consequences, 
but on how a maxim stands or falls with respect to the moral law. What the highest good 
does is to present a way for Kant to respond to a deep human need to know what the effect of 
moral action will be—to envision the consequences in a morally satisfying way.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Kant carefully justifies all the components of his moral religion, which is heavily connected to 
traditional Christian doctrines, within the text of the Religion. So naturally any moral beliefs that 
could alternatively serve the same functions as Kant’s practical postulates would also have to be 
carefully evaluated on other grounds. (Ronald Green’s Religious Reason does a good job in assessing 
this possibility). 
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In other words, this allows Kant to be sensitive to the fact that we care about the 
consequences of our actions, despite the fact that the moral law itself is not contingent on the 
probable outcomes of our actions. It is a very different commitment to consequences than 
that traditionally found in consequentialism. As a result, the view could be argued to be—like 
consequentialism—one which acknowledges that we cannot make sense of morality without 
attention to the effects of actions. Yet if one believes the account successful, it may help us to 
make sense of our concern for consequences while avoiding the traps of the morality of 
actions hinging on consequences: namely, excessive demandingness with regards to both the 
amount a moral agent is required to do, and what sacrifices of personal commitments or 
relationships a moral agent may have make. (Of course, Kant has his own problems with 
rigorousness, so this is no panacea.). Nonetheless, Kant can acknowledge that we care about 
consequences, and how his ethical theory is sensitive to what we care about, by making the 
argument for the highest good. While this does not need to resolve the main debate, it is an 
interesting counterpoint that helps us make sense of moral sacrifices and the role of hope.  
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